Reinforcing the Seams: Guaranteeing the Promise of California’s Landmark Anti-Sweatshop Law - An Evaluation of Assembly Bill 633 Six Years Later by Seville, Marci
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Women’s Employment Rights Clinic Centers & Programs
9-2005
Reinforcing the Seams: Guaranteeing the Promise
of California’s Landmark Anti-Sweatshop Law - An
Evaluation of Assembly Bill 633 Six Years Later
Marci Seville
Golden Gate University School of Law, mseville@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/werc
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers & Programs at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Women’s Employment Rights Clinic by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Seville, Marci, "Reinforcing the Seams: Guaranteeing the Promise of California’s Landmark Anti-Sweatshop Law - An Evaluation of
Assembly Bill 633 Six Years Later" (2005). Women’s Employment Rights Clinic. Paper 4.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/werc/4
Guaranteeing the Promise of
California’s Landmark 
Anti-Sweatshop Law




With contributions from Asian Law Caucus, 
Garment Worker Center, and Women’s Employment Rights Clinic
MEMBERS OF THE GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE
Founded in 1972, the mission of the Asian Law Caucus (ALC) is to promote, 
advance and represent the legal and civil rights of Asian and Pacific Islander 
(API) communities. Integrating legal services with community education and 
community organizing campaigns, the ALC strives to empower low-income 
API community members to assert their rights and participate actively 
in American society. Since the early 1990s, the ALC has played a key 
leadership role in the improvement of garment workers’ conditions. 
For more information visit www.asianlawcaucus.org or call 415-896-1701. 
ALC, 939 Market St., Ste. 201, San Francisco, CA 94103.
The Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC) is a nonprofit organization 
in Los Angeles dedicated to advocating for civil rights, providing legal 
services and education, and building coalitions to positively influence 
and impact Asian Pacific Americans and to create a more equitable and 
harmonious society. APALC is the largest provider of direct legal services, 
civil rights advocacy, community education, and impact litigation for low-
income Asian Pacific Americans in the country. Since 1994, APALC’s 
Workers’ Rights Project has served hundreds of Asian and Latino garment 
workers and assisted them in recovering over 5 million dollars in unpaid 
wages and in demanding changes to abusive corporate practices. 
For more information visit www.apalc.org or call 213-977-7500. 
APALC, 1145 Wilshire Blvd., 2nd Fl., Los Angeles, CA 90017.
The Garment Worker Center (GWC) is an independent non-profit organization 
dedicated to organizing Asian and Latino garment workers in Los Angeles. 
The mission of the GWC is to empower garment workers in the Los Angeles 
area and to work in solidarity with other low-wage immigrant workers and 
disenfranchised communities in the struggle for social, economic and 
environmental justice. 
For more information visit www.garmentworkercenter.org or call 213-748-5866. 
Garment Worker Center, 1250 So. Los Angeles St., Ste. 213, Los Angeles, CA 
90015.
Founded in 1995, Sweatshop Watch is a coalition of over 30 labor, 
community, civil rights, immigrant rights, women’s, religious and student 
organizations, and many individuals, committed to eliminating the 
exploitation that occurs in sweatshops. Sweatshop Watch serves low-
wage workers nationally and globally, with a focus on garment workers in 
California. We believe that workers should earn a living wage in a safe, 
decent work environment, and that those responsible for the exploitation of 
sweatshop workers must be held accountable. 
For more information visit www.sweatshopwatch.org or call 213-748-5945. 
Sweatshop Watch, 1250 So. Los Angeles St., Ste. 214, Los Angeles, CA 90015.
The Women’s Employment Rights Clinic (WERC) is a clinical teaching 
program at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. WERC 
faculty and students advise, counsel and represent low-wage and immigrant 
workers in employment-related matters, including individual and systemic 
claims for wage and hour violations. WERC has been involved in legislative 
and regulatory advocacy on AB 633, and has represented hundreds of 
workers in wage and hour cases in court and administrative proceedings. 
For more information visit www.ggu.edu/school_of_law or call 415-442-6647. 
WERC, 536 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94105-2968.
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During my first term in the California State Assembly and as Chair of the Labor Committee,  
I sought new solutions to the state’s most pressing labor problems.  A top priority was addressing 
sweatshop abuse in California’s multi-billion-dollar garment industry, where immigrant workers toil 
long, hard hours-- often without receiving minimum wage or overtime.  I worked with an unlikely 
group of labor advocates, garment industry leaders, and retailers to reach a consensus about what was 
needed. The result was the passage of the most significant garment law in nearly two decades.  
Assembly Bill 633 (AB 633), which was signed into law in September 1999, represented a huge 
breakthrough for tens of thousands of workers in California.  All sides worked successfully to craft 
mechanisms to protect workers when a garment contractor goes under or refuses to pay.  The bill 
created a unique “wage guarantee” so that apparel companies would be held responsible, along with their contractors, for ensuring 
workers get paid their legal wages.
AB 633 has been touted as the toughest law of its kind to address sweatshops in the garment industry.  Since its passage, this 
landmark law has successfully helped countless garment workers recover millions of dollars in owed wages.  Better enforcement of 
the law, however, is essential for AB 633 to fulfill its potential and ensure that garment workers are granted the most basic labor law 
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hen California’s Assembly Bill 633 
(AB 633)1 was signed into law in 
September 1999, it held much promise 
as the strongest anti-sweatshop bill 
in the nation. AB 633’s enactment signaled an historic 
consensus—among the state’s legislators, industry leaders, 
and labor advocates — that something had to be done 
about horrendous labor abuses in the garment industry, 
and that those who profit most from sweatshops should be 
held responsible for eliminating them. 
Before AB 633 was enacted, garment workers could not 
seek their unpaid wages from apparel manufacturers and 
retailers in wage claims before the state’s Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement (DLSE) — even when these 
companies made their clothes in sweatshops. Workers 
could only file claims against the sweatshops themselves, 
which ignored the businesses that create and perpetuate 
sweatshops in the first place. Thus, prior to AB 633, 
workers filing wage claims were deprived of a remedy 
when garment factories operating as sweatshops failed to 
pay workers their wages and absconded. AB 633’s central 
provision, its wage guarantee, aims to close this loophole 
by requiring corporations to act responsibly and pay 
workers what they are owed. Specifically, AB 633 sets up 
an alternative mechanism apart from the court system — 
an expedited administrative claims process culminating in 
a hearing before DLSE — for garment workers to recover 
an estimated $81 million in unpaid wages each year.2 As 
part of this process, manufacturers and retailers are now 
legally responsible as “guarantors” for ensuring, along with 
the California garment factories they use to make their 
clothes, that workers are not denied their most basic right 
to receive minimum wage and overtime.
 
California has long held the unfortunate distinction of 
being the garment sweatshop capital of the nation. Los 
Angeles County alone produces approximately $13 billion 
in clothing each year3 — at the expense of workers who 
routinely toil under inhumane and illegal conditions. The 
largest manufacturing employer in Los Angeles County,4 
the garment industry is notorious for rampant workplace 
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nearly 70% of garment factories in Los Angeles fail to 
pay federal minimum wage and overtime.5 Even though 
only 6% of a garment’s retail cost goes to the worker who 
made it,6 retailers and manufacturers continuously seek to 
boost profits by demanding lower and lower labor costs 
and thus constantly depressing workers’ wages. As a result, 
the average garment worker in Los Angeles made under 
$10,600 in 2000,7 less than 77% of the poverty-level 
income for a family of three in that year.8
The very structure of the garment industry is designed 
to allow retailers and manufacturers to utilize and profit 
from low-wage, exploited labor — as they simultaneously 
disavow responsibility for substandard working 
conditions. Retailers sell brand name clothing directly 
to the public and place orders with manufacturers to 
produce their clothing. Manufacturers, in turn, typically 
design garments, select fabrics, and seek out contractors 
(garment factories) to provide the actual labor for apparel 
production. Contractors operate at the mercy of retailers 
and manufacturers, which pressure contractors to sew 
garments for increasingly lower prices and use contractors 
to avoid direct supervision of workers and (they hope) 
direct responsibility for sweatshop conditions. Retailers 
and manufacturers routinely fail to pay enough for the 
production of their clothes to ensure that contractors 
are able to pay minimum wage and overtime to garment 
workers, who are mostly Latina and Asian immigrant 
women. Many contractors, in turn, end up operating as 
sweatshops.
Powerful apparel companies have long hoped that, 
by engaging in multi-layered contractual schemes in 
an attempt to distance themselves from the workers 
who make their clothes, they could maximize profits 
while shielding themselves from legal responsibility for 
sweatshop labor. AB 633 was intended to put an end to 
this practice. With its wage guarantee, AB 633 explicitly 
acknowledges the economic reality that large clothing 
companies exert control over the working conditions 
under which their garments are produced — and thus 
should not escape liability when workers are deprived of 
their hard-earned wages.
Six years ago, AB 633 provided hope that by penetrating 
the industry’s subcontracting structure and mandating 
corporate accountability through the wage claims process, 
the state could play a more active role in improving 
working conditions for garment workers. Since its 
enactment, thousands of garment workers have used AB 
633 to claim their unpaid wages, while labor advocates 
have monitored AB 633’s implementation and pushed the 
state labor agency to effectively enforce the law. Indeed, 
legislators, big business, workers, advocates, and the media 
have all closely scrutinized how AB 633 has fared over the 
years. 
Today, AB 633 stands as a landmark law with great 
potential — much of it yet to be realized — to fight 
against the proliferation of sweatshops and corporate 
abuse in the garment industry, and to serve as model 
legislation for other low-wage industries across California 
and around the nation in which workers are denied their 
most basic workplace rights. In documenting the successes 
of AB 633, as well as presenting the challenges garment 
workers still face in recovering their wages under the 
law, this report seeks to provide an answer to the pivotal 
question: Has AB 633 fulfilled its promise? 
To answer this question, we analyzed a statistically 
random sample of over 200 AB 633 claims docketed 
by the state labor agency between March 31, 2001 and 
February 18, 2004. Our Key Findings illustrate that AB 
633 is a powerful tool that has been ineffectively utilized 
by DLSE and hence ignored by many companies that 
continue to profit from sweatshop labor. This report 
concludes with a series of recommendations which the 
authors hope to pursue with key stakeholders as part of 
our collective responsibility to realize the promise of  
AB 633 —and to make sweatshops in garment and other 
low-wage industries a part of our past, not our future. ■
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en years ago, the discovery in El Monte, 
California, of 72 Thai garment workers forced 
to work behind barbed wire and under armed 
guard, while sewing brand-name labels for 
many of the nation’s leading manufacturers and retailers, 
ripped through the foundations of the garment industry 
like a tumultuous fault line.9  The horror of the El Monte 
slave sweatshop brought the message home: California is 
the nation’s sweatshop capital, where Los Angeles County 
alone produces approximately $13 billion in clothing each 
year10— at the expense of garment workers who routinely 
toil under inhumane and illegal conditions.
The largest manufacturing employer in Los Angeles 
County,11 the garment industry has long been plagued 
by rampant workplace abuses.  According to the U.S. 
Department of Labor, nearly 70% of garment factories 
in Los Angeles fail to pay federal minimum wage and 
overtime.12  California’s government agency charged 
with enforcing workplace health and safety laws found 
health and safety violations in nearly 100% of factories 
inspected.13  A 2003 UCLA study found that three out 
of every four garment factories cited by the Bureau of 
Field Enforcement (BOFE), part of California’s Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), violated 
record-keeping requirements14 or failed to obtain a license 
required to operate legally as a garment business in the 
state.15  The report also found that the garment industry 
was more likely than all other industries inspected by 
BOFE to be cited for minimum wage and overtime 
violations.16  Such statistics, and the deplorable conditions 
of the El Monte case, belie the fiction that sweatshops are 
isolated occurrences.  
Today, apparel production remains one of California’s 
principal industries, with Los Angeles the epicenter 
of production in both the state and nation.17  The 
garment industry continues to provide employment for a 
significant segment of California’s workers.  As of April 
2005, Los Angeles County counted 63,500 garment 
workers,18 but there are likely thousands more employed 
by factories that fail to register for a business license and/
or underpay payroll taxes.
CHAPTE
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The very structure of the garment industry, both in 
California and around the world, is designed to allow 
apparel manufacturers and retailers to utilize and profit 
from low-wage, exploited labor — as they simultaneously 
disavow responsibility for substandard wages and working 
conditions.  
At the top of the apparel pyramid sit retailers such 
as Wal-Mart and Target that place orders with 
manufacturers and sell brand-name clothing directly to 
the public.  Retailers reap the largest share of profits and 
impose the downward pressure on prices that is one of the 
root causes of sweatshops.  
At the second level are manufacturers, such as XOXO 
and Dockers, that typically design garments, select fabrics, 
create detailed specifications for apparel production, and 
seek out contractors (garment factories) for the actual 
assembly of their clothes.  Some manufacturers sell their 
clothing to big retail chains; other companies, such as 
Forever 21, bebe, Charlotte Russe, the Gap, and Guess, 
combine manufacturing and retailing operations and sell 
their private label clothing directly to the public through 
their own retail stores.
Retailers and manufacturers pressure contractors, who 
occupy the third level of the industry, to sew garments 
for lower and lower prices.  Competition among 
contractors is fierce and many open up and shut down 
within a few months to a year.  Contractors, mostly 
immigrant entrepreneurs with little capital and often poor 
knowledge of labor laws, operate at the mercy of retailers 
and manufacturers, who dictate the styles, quantities, 
turnaround times, and quality of garment production, as 
well as the prices they will pay for contractors to do this 
work.  Retailers and manufacturers use contractors to 
avoid direct supervision of workers and (they hope) direct 
responsibility for sweatshop conditions — while they 
routinely fail to pay enough for the production of their 
clothes to ensure that contractors are able to pay workers 
minimum wage and overtime.  Many contractors, in turn, 
end up operating as sweatshops.   
At the very bottom of the pyramid — the greatest in 
number and lowest in economic and political power — are 
garment workers.  They are mostly Latina and Asian 
immigrant women, and they comprise the foundation of 
the industry.19   
PYRAMID OF PROFIT AND POWER: 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GARMENT INDUSTRY 
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California’s Garment Industry: Pyramid of Profit and Power
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GARMENT WORK: LONG HOURS AT SUBSTANDARD PAY
In California, 2000 Census data indicated that garment workers earned $5.18 per hour at a time when the minimum 
wage was $5.75.20  The Garment Worker Center, a non-profit organization in downtown Los Angeles, found that among 
the several hundred workers they assisted with AB 633 wage claims in 2001-2003, the average pay was effectively $3.28 
per hour, and the average work week was 52 hours.21  During a given week, month, or season, garment workers are often 
required to work extensive overtime but are typically denied their overtime earnings; they may also be terminated from 
employment without prior notice if work is slow.  Workers are usually paid a piece rate of only a few cents per garment.  
Even though only 6% of a garment’s retail cost goes to the workers who made it,22 retailers and manufacturers demand 
increasingly lower labor costs and thus constantly depress workers’ wages in their quest for higher profits.  As a result, the 
average garment worker in Los Angeles made under $10,600 in 2000, less than 77% of the poverty-level income for a 
family of three in that year.23
THE PASSAGE OF AB 633: 
THE TOUGHEST ANTI-SWEATSHOP LAW IN THE NATION
In the wake of El Monte and other high-
profile sweatshop exposés, the public spotlight 
illuminated the true nature of working conditions 
in the garment industry and raised consumer 
awareness about the need to hold retailers and 
manufacturers legally responsible in order to 
eradicate sweatshops.  
Building upon this growing awareness, labor 
advocates, including the Asian Law Caucus, 
the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, the 
California Labor Federation, Sweatshop Watch, 
and the Union of Needletrades, Textiles and 
Industrial Employees (now UNITE HERE), 
sponsored Assembly Bill 633 (AB 633), which state Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg introduced and state Senator 
Tom Hayden co-authored, to clean up the industry.  Apparel representatives came to the table with labor advocates and 
engaged in intensive negotiations over the bill.  As a culmination of these collective efforts, Governor Gray Davis signed 
AB 633 in September 1999.  AB 633 became the law of this state on January 1, 2000.24
Applauding the unlikely group of labor advocates, garment industry leaders, and retailers who worked together to pass 
the bill, Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg stated, “This agreement represents a huge breakthrough for thousands of 
garment workers.  All sides worked successfully to find a solution that assures workers aren’t the losers when a garment 
contractor goes under or refuses to pay.”  
Rojana Cheunchujit, who was freed from the El Monte sweatshop in 1995, commented at the bill’s passage, “I once asked 
my contractor employer why we got paid so little.  She said it was because she did not receive much money from the 
manufacturers.  So that was the reason I would not get paid minimum wage.  This law will help the many workers who are 
not even getting paid minimum wage.  It will make the manufacturers accountable.”
After decades of advocacy, labor advocates succeeded in enacting the strongest garment worker legislation in the nation.  
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This report is based on information from a number of 
sources:
 A random sample of AB 633 case files maintained 
by DLSE.  The random sample25 consisted of 208 
AB 633 claims, or approximately 20%, of the 1044 
AB 633 cases that had been docketed26 against the 
first defendant (usually the contractor) between 
March 31, 2001 and February 18, 2004 in the DLSE 
Los Angeles office, and that had been closed for all 
defendants (both the contractor and guarantor(s)), 
as indicated in data provided by DLSE on April 6, 
2004.27  These files were provided to us by DLSE with 
workers’ confidential information redacted.28  The time 
period analyzed in this report begins just after that 
covered by a preliminary assessment of approximately 
the first 15 months of AB 633’s implementation, from 
January 1, 2000 to March 26, 2001.29 
 Interviews with 10 DLSE staff in the wage 
enforcement, bureau of field enforcement, legal, and 
licensing units.  Selected comments and proposals 
from these DLSE staff have been incorporated into 
this report’s Key Findings and Key Recommendations.
 Six case studies of AB 633 claims filed by garment 
workers, most of whom were represented by 
organizations that collaborated on this report:  the 
Asian Law Caucus, the Asian Pacific American 
Legal Center, the Garment Worker Center, and the 
Women’s Employment Rights Clinic.
 Data from DLSE received in response to California 
Public Record Act requests, as well as data that is 
publicly available on DLSE’s website.
The random sample includes 208 AB 633 claims filed 
against 160 garment contractors and 587 guarantors.  
Multiple garment workers from the same factory may 
each file individual AB 633 claims against their mutual 
contractor and guarantor(s).  These count as multiple 
claims, but as one episode.  Thus, one episode is equivalent 
to either (a) a single claim filed by one worker or (b) 
multiple claims filed by a group of workers against the 
same contractor.  In our random sample, there were 164 
episodes.30    
DLSE often consolidates multiple claims filed against 
the same defendant(s) in a single episode for purposes 
of the AB 633 investigation, Settlement Conference, 
Findings, and/or Hearing, etc.  For example, DLSE 
may issue one subpoena against a contractor requesting 
payroll records for all workers who filed AB 633 claims 
in a single episode.  Therefore, although data is available 
for each individual claim, some data is more meaningful 
if it is analyzed in terms of the number of episodes in 
which certain characteristics or behaviors occur.  In those 
instances, this report refers to the number or percentage of 
episodes. ■
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I.   GARMENT WORKER FILES CLAIM     DAY 1
■ Worker files claim with DLSE by filling out “Initial Report or Claim” form asking workers for basic 
information about themselves, the contractor, their work hours and pay, and the amount of money 
the worker claims to be owed.  
■ Worker may also be asked to fill out “Addendum to DLSE Form 1.” This form asks additional 
questions specific to the garment industry, such as the labels and descriptions of the clothing the 
worker sewed.  It also asks about common workplace violations, including whether the contractor 
punched workers’ timecards and paid in cash with no documentation or deductions.
■ Claim is soon docketed in DLSE case management system and a DLSE deputy is assigned to 
manage and administer the claim.
II.   INVESTIGATION                                                         DAY 10 – 59
■ Within 10 days of receiving a claim, DLSE must send a “Notice of Claim and Meet and Confer 
Conference” to the worker, the contractor, and any potential guarantors. The notice includes 
basic information about the claim and notifies all parties of the date of the Meet-and-Confer 
conference (“Settlement Conference”), which should occur no later than 60 days after the date 
DLSE received the claim. 
■ A deputy from the AB 633 wage adjudication unit of DLSE (District deputy) issues subpoenas to 
the contractor and potential guarantors for business records.
■ An investigator from DLSE’s Bureau of Field Enforcement (BOFE deputy) is assigned to the case.  
■ The BOFE deputy interviews the worker and any witnesses, visits the contractor and inspects 
business records, and attempts to contact and obtain business records from potential guarantors.
■ The BOFE deputy prepares a “Findings and Assessment” (“DLSE Findings”).  DLSE Findings 
state the results of the investigation, including an assessment of wages, damages, and penalties 
owed and findings of guarantor liability. 
III.  MEET-AND-CONFER CONFERENCE     DAY 60
  (“SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE”)
■ DLSE deputy managing the case convenes and oversees the Settlement Conference.  The worker, 
contractor, and all named guarantors are required to attend.
■ The BOFE deputy presents DLSE Findings to the parties.
■ The parties have the opportunity to settle the claim. 
■ If the defendants do not attend or if a settlement is not reached, a formal hearing should be 
scheduled within 30 days of the Settlement Conference.
OVERVIEW OF AB 633 CLAIMS PROCESS
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IV.  HEARING                                                                      DAY 90 – 105
■ A DLSE hearing officer presides over an administrative hearing.
■ All parties testify, present evidence, and/or witnesses, and have the opportunity to cross-examine 
other parties. The BOFE deputy is asked to testify about her investigation, including a proposed 
assessment of guarantor liability, but cannot testify about her assessment of wages, damages, and 
penalties due. 
V.   ORDER, DECISION OR AWARD (“ORDER”)           DAY 105 – 120
■ Within 15 days of the hearing, DLSE must issue a decision, or “Order, Decision, or Award” 
(“Order”). The Order is a written determination that includes the award of any wages, damages, 
and/or penalties found to be due from the contractor and/or guarantors.  It also includes a 
statement of facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning behind the Order award.
VI.   APPEAL                   DAY 120 – 130
■ Within 10 days after the Order is issued, any party may file an appeal with the California 
Superior Court.
VII.  JUDGMENT AND COLLECTIONS     DAY 130 AND ON
■ If the Order is not appealed or paid, DLSE sends a copy of the Order to the Superior Court.  
The Superior Court then enters a judgment reflecting the amount of wages, damages, and 
penalties awarded in the Order.
■ DLSE provides the worker with the option of attempting to collect the Judgment herself or 
assigning it to the California Franchise Tax Board.  If the worker is unable to collect her unpaid 
wages from the contractor and/or guarantors, she may submit a claim for unpaid wages to the 
state’s Garment Special Fund, which is funded by a portion of garment registration fees paid by 
garment contractors and guarantors to operate their business legally in California.
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hen it was signed into law six years ago, 
AB 633 was lauded as a model piece of 
legislation signaling that California was 
serious about addressing the root cause of sweatshops in 
the garment industry.  Since the bill’s passage, the state 
labor agency has been entrusted with the vital task of 
enforcing AB 633, and thus with the responsibility of 
translating this historic law from paper into practice.  
This evaluation is based on a statistical analysis of a 
random sample of over 200 wage claims between March 
31, 2001 and February 18, 2004.31 Our Key Findings 
reveal that although AB 633 has helped some garment 
workers reclaim their wages, DLSE’s implementation of 
the law has fallen short of realizing AB 633’s promise. 
■ Since AB 633 became law, there has been a 
sharp rise in the numbers of garment workers who 
have filed wage claims, but this increase still pales 
in comparison to the tens of thousands of workers 
who have been deprived of their wages.
AB 633 establishes an alternative mechanism apart from 
the court system — an expedited administrative claims 
process before DLSE — for garment workers to recover 
their unpaid wages from companies responsible for 
sweatshops. In recognition of rampant labor law violations 
in the garment industry, the Legislature intended this 
process to enable more and more workers to file claims 
and seek redress for exploitative working conditions.   
This intention appears to have been realized. The number 
of wage claims filed by garment workers statewide, and 
particularly in Los Angeles, has increased four-fold since 
AB 633 became law.
 Average annual number of wage claims filed by 
garment workers statewide:
● 1995-1998:     565 32
● 2001-2004:  2,282 33
Nonetheless, the number of garment workers who have 
filed claims represents only a tiny fraction of the tens of 
thousands of garment workers — 70% of whom have been 
denied minimum wage and overtime34 — who labor in 
sweatshops and are covered by the protections of AB 633.
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■ Through AB 633’s wage guarantee, garment workers are starting to recover unpaid wages from companies 
that use sweatshops. The overwhelming majority of these companies, however, still do not pay a single 
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Before AB 633 was enacted, garment workers could not 
seek unpaid wages from garment manufacturers and 
retailers in wage claims before DLSE — even when these 
companies made their clothes in sweatshops. Thus, prior 
to AB 633, workers filing wage claims were deprived of a 
remedy when contractors operating as sweatshops failed 
to pay workers their wages and absconded. AB 633’s 
wage guarantee aims to close this loophole exploited by 
companies that profit from sweatshop labor. Garment 
manufacturers and retailers are now legally responsible as 
“guarantors” for ensuring, along with the contractors they 
use to make their clothes, that workers are paid minimum 
wage and overtime.  
In the time period covered by our evaluation, the average 
amount garment workers recovered from contractors and 
guarantors was over three times larger than the average 
amount recovered during the first 15 months of AB 633’s 
implementation.35  
Our evaluation reveals that guarantors are paying 
workers some portion of their unpaid wages, 
predominantly as a result of Orders36 or settlements with 
workers:
 Guarantors paid almost 30% of the total amount 
of money paid to workers.37 Before AB 633 
became law, companies that used sweatshops 
were not required to pay a cent of workers’ 
administrative wage claims.  
 Guarantors that paid workers as a result of an 
Order paid 100% of the amount ordered against 
them.38 This is in stark contrast to the first 15 
months of AB 633’s implementation, when 
guarantors did not pay anything pursuant to an 
Order.39 
 Over 25% of the guarantors entered into 
settlements with workers.40 Almost 80% of the 
wages that workers recovered from guarantors was 
paid through settlements. 
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CASE STUDY: 
The Wage Guarantee Pays Off   
In January 2004, Maria Lopez,41 a Los Angeles garment worker represented by the Asian Pacific American Legal 
Center, filed a claim for wages owed against the sweatshop contractor Pocket Fashion and the clothing companies 
whose garments she made at the sweatshop, including Charlotte Russe (a private label retailer). Ms. Lopez typically 
worked at the sweatshop 6 days a week, for up to 10.5 hours a day.  She was forced to work “off-the-clock”: to 
punch her time card well after she began working, and to punch out well before she stopped. She was paid by the 
piece and not compensated for all the minimum wage and overtime she had earned.
At the hearing, Charlotte Russe claimed through its attorney that it was not a wage guarantor under AB 633. 
However, written purchase orders submitted by Charlotte Russe itself belied its claim that it was not connected 
to the sweatshop conditions at Pocket Fashion and instead demonstrated the company’s involvement in Pocket 
Fashion’s manufacturing operations. Ms. Lopez argued to DLSE that these documents illustrated that Charlotte 
Russe ordered the sweatshop to make thousands of garments for Charlotte Russe’s “Rampage” stores; that 
Charlotte Russe communicated with the sweatshop regarding detailed instructions on how to make those garments, 
including quantity, style, size, color, and fit of each garment; and that she was then required to sew Charlotte Russe 
clothing according to its specifications, while her most basic rights to receive minimum wage and overtime were 
being violated. 
In May 2005, DLSE issued an Order against Pocket Fashion and Charlotte Russe. DLSE found that Pocket Fashion 
had engaged in numerous illegal practices, including denying Ms. Lopez minimum wage and overtime. DLSE also 
found that Charlotte Russe was legally responsible for Ms. Lopez’s unpaid wages for the period of time she worked 
on Charlotte Russe clothing. Charlotte Russe did not appeal the decision. Instead, the company paid 100% of the 
amount it owed Ms. Lopez. 
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Despite these indications that garment workers are 
receiving some protection from the wage guarantee, 
workers are still being deprived on average of two-thirds 
of their wages owed.
 Workers received from contractors and guarantors 
only 31% of total wages claimed.42 This amount 
does not include any damages, penalties, or 
other payments to which they are also lawfully 
entitled—and which typically more than double 
their claim amount.
 Only 15% of guarantors paid any money to 
workers (as a result of an Order, settlement, or 
judgment).  85% paid nothing.
 Guarantors paid on average only 11% of the 
average wages claimed by workers.43 
 Even for the subset of workers whose claims were 
fully adjudicated (i.e., an Order was issued in their 
favor following an administrative hearing), 60% 
of guarantors against which Orders were issued 
did not pay a single penny owed to the worker.44 
Moreover, DLSE collected on only three of the 
12 judgments entered against guarantors after 
they failed to pay Orders.45
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CASE STUDY: 
The Black Hole of Collections 
For four years, Elena Rodriguez46 worked as a single needle sewing machine operator at K&S, a garment factory in 
downtown Los Angeles. During this time she worked up to 58 hours a week and was never allowed to punch her 
own time card, which was routinely falsified to reflect fewer hours than she actually worked. She was paid in cash 
for the weeks when she was paid less than minimum wage. 
After the hearing on her case, Ms. Rodriguez won an Order from DLSE totaling almost $20,000 in unpaid wages, 
penalties, and damages. Nevertheless, the contractor paid absolutely nothing, even after a judgment was entered, 
and Ms. Rodriguez was not provided any assistance with collections. In the end, she was left with nothing more 
than a piece of paper.
❖ ❖ ❖ ❖ ❖
The fact that workers may pursue wage claims all the way through a hearing, only to be unable to collect on 
a judgment in their favor, not only demoralizes workers but also undermines the purpose of the state’s labor 
protections.
It is unclear why so many guarantors and contractors continue to ignore Orders and judgments, although the 
fact that they are able to do so with relative impunity can only embolden predatory garment companies. Low-
wage workers are ill-equipped to pursue collections on their own, and DLSE seldom pursues collections on 
their behalf, despite DLSE’s legislative authority to do so.47 Instead, DLSE gives workers the option of referring 
outstanding judgments to the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) for collection efforts.48 However, FTB has 
not actively pursued collection of judgments, including those from AB 633 wage claims.49 Furthermore, the 
California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), the agency that oversees DLSE, provides FTB with funds 
to pay for the salary of only one employee assigned to process collections claims.50 As of February 2004, FTB 
took an average of 18 months to process a collections claim.51 Moreover, once DIR refers claims to FTB, DIR 
stops monitoring the claims and closes those cases in DIR’s database.52
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■ Guarantors and contractors low-ball settlement amounts so workers recover on average only one-third of 
wages owed, and DLSE lets some guarantors completely off the hook before all wages are paid.  
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The vast majority of claims are resolved through 
settlements.
 Over 75% of workers reached settlements 
(including joint settlements53) with the contractor 
and/or one or more guarantors. Workers 
recovered an average settlement of $1,772. 
 When we examine settlement rates of contractors 
(including joint settlements), contractors settled 
in over 60% of claims. In these claims, contractors 
paid an average settlement of $1,589. Almost 99% 
of the money contractors paid to workers was 
through settlements. 
 When we examine settlement rates of guarantors 
(including joint settlements), over 25% of 
guarantors settled. In these claims, guarantors 
paid an average settlement of $442. Almost 80% 
of the money guarantors paid to workers was 
through settlements. 
Settlements have the potential to improve the ability of 
workers — who in many cases have been waiting years 
to recover unpaid wages — to actually receive their wages 
more quickly than if they proceeded to a hearing, where 
outcomes are not certain.54 Settlements also offer the 
advantage of saving scarce time and resources of all parties 
involved. 
However, contractors and guarantors pay settlement 
amounts far below the wages owed to workers.  
 Workers who reached settlements with 
contractors and/or guarantors received only 34% 
of total wages claimed.55
 
 Workers who settled with contractors recovered 
less than 31% f total wages claimed from these 
contractors.56 
 Workers who settled with guarantors recovered 
only 16% of total wages claimed from these 
guarantors.57
 Even when workers were still owed wages, 11% 
of all guarantors were completely let off the hook 
after the workers settled with the contractor and/
or the other guarantor(s).58 DLSE abandoned 
the wage guarantee and did not give workers the 
option to seek the balance of wages owed against 
any remaining guarantor(s). 
Settlements in which workers feel compelled to accept 
such low amounts serve to undermine the purpose of 
the wage guarantee. Contractors and guarantors have no 
incentive to ensure that workers are paid their wages in 
the first place since they end up paying so little to resolve 
claims.
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CASE STUDY: 
Taking the Low Road on Settlements
Laura Sanchez and Julia Mera,59 two workers not represented by an advocate, filed AB 633 wage claims against 
C&C Apparel Inc., a garment contractor. Both Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mera routinely worked 11 hours a day, almost 
non-stop — with at most only one 15-minute break daily. They were paid by the piece and forced to sign time 
cards that did not accurately reflect all the hours they worked — or else they would not have been paid at all.
At the Settlement Conference, a DLSE deputy told Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mera it was better to accept a small 
settlement now than to continue to a hearing where they might not win anything. As a result, the workers reported 
later to the Garment Worker Center that they felt pressured to accept a low settlement (just over 22% of wages 
claimed by one worker and over 47% by the other). Furthermore, when the workers asked for a copy of the 
settlement agreements they had signed, DLSE refused to give them a copy.
❖ ❖ ❖ ❖ ❖
Workers may be willing to accept settlement amounts that are only a fraction of what they are owed because 
they urgently need the money to meet basic living expenses, and because they know that even if they win 
their claim, it is very unlikely they will be paid pursuant to an Order or judgment. Many workers may also 
feel pressured to accept low settlements recommended by DLSE, whose statements carry much authority 
and power in the eyes of workers. Moreover, there is currently no procedure in place for DLSE deputies to 
inform workers of their right to recover unpaid wages from the Garment Special Fund, which was created by 
the Legislature precisely for the purpose of paying workers otherwise unable to collect the wages they are 
owed.60 DLSE’s failure to inform workers of the existence of this fund may contribute to workers accepting low 
settlements instead of continuing with a time-consuming claim that they believe will not improve their ability 
to recover their wages.
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■ DLSE fails to identify guarantors and conduct 
adequate investigations of guarantors on a 
consistent basis, thus undermining the wage 
guarantee. 
Every AB 633 wage claim should typically involve a 
minimum of two defendants: the contractor and the 
guarantor. DLSE is charged with investigating each claim 
and identifying potential guarantors.61  
 In the time period covered by our evaluation, 
DLSE identified62 wage guarantors in about half 
the episodes.63 This is 3.5 times the rate at which 
DLSE identified guarantors during the first 15 
months of AB 633’s implementation.64 
DLSE appears to be doing a better job of identifying 
guarantors, which is the first step in enforcing AB 
633’s wage guarantee. Nevertheless, DLSE should be 
identifying guarantors in every case in which it is possible 
to do so — not merely half the time. Indeed, workers — 
not DLSE — identified 50% of all guarantors.65 Without 
adequate identification of guarantors by DLSE, the wage 
guarantee holds little meaning.
Once guarantors are identified, conducting a proper 
and thorough investigation of guarantors is the 
second step — and perhaps most important one — in 
enforcing the wage guarantee. In each AB 633 wage 
claim, DLSE must issue what is called a “Findings 
and Assessment” (referred to in our evaluation as the 
“DLSE Findings”) after conducting an independent 
investigation of the claim.66  
As part of this investigation, a fact-specific examination 
into a contractor’s relationship with potential guarantors 
is necessary to prevent guarantors from using contractual 
schemes to obscure their true connection to sweatshops. 
DLSE’s investigative powers, including the authority to 
issue subpoenas and inspect business records, are often the 
only effective tool for pursuing claims against guarantors. 
Thorough investigations enable DLSE to identify the 
correct legal names of guarantors, conduct follow-up on 
guarantors identified by workers, and identify additional 
guarantors otherwise unknown to workers. Moreover, 
DLSE Findings, which present the results of the agency’s 
investigation including a determination of wages owed 
and assessment of guarantor liability, can be effective in 
spurring guarantors to pay workers.67
REINFORCING THE SEAMS · 27
CASE STUDIES:
Guarantors Ante Up When DLSE 
Findings Raise Stakes
Between August 2003 and May 2004, 33 garment workers filed AB 633 wage claims in San Francisco against 
the garment contractor GNT, Inc. (GNT). The 33 claimants worked primarily as single needle seamstresses, but 
performed other duties for GNT, including packaging, inspection, cleaning, cutting thread, and making samples. 
Claimants regularly worked 9.5 hours a day, Monday through Saturday, with only one half-hour lunch break; some 
also routinely worked on Sundays. Although each claimant worked overtime, none were paid for it, and several 
were denied minimum wage.
At the Settlement Conference on their claims, the workers, represented by the Asian Law Caucus, obtained 
approximately $145,000 in back wages from the five guarantors in their case: Jessica McClintock, Biscotti, Profile 
Design/Bellwether, Western Wear, and Shane Hunter. The guarantor settlements (in addition to approximately 
$35,000 from another alleged guarantor, Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI), in a separate settlement with DLSE) 
paid nearly 100% of the workers’ unpaid wages. The presentation of DLSE Findings at the Settlement Conference 
sent a clear message to the guarantors regarding their legal liability, thus enhancing the workers’ ability to negotiate 
favorable settlements with the guarantors.  
❖ ❖ ❖ ❖ ❖
Juan Ramirez,68 a worker represented by the Garment Worker Center (GWC), filed an AB 633 wage claim against a 
garment contractor and numerous guarantors whose labels he had sewn at the factory. The worker furnished DLSE 
with the labels but the correct legal entities of the manufacturers associated with the labels could not be discerned. 
However, the BOFE investigator accessed the contractor’s garment registration information with the state, which 
contained information indicating that JBL Cal Apparel, Inc. (JBL) was the primary guarantor. As a result, DLSE was 
able to notify JBL of the claim and its potential liability.
After conducting an independent investigation of the facts, the BOFE deputy assessed liability against JBL in the 
DLSE Findings. According to the DLSE Findings, the investigation revealed that there was “compelling evidence 
of duplicate employee time cards being kept…[by the contractor].” Although JBL initially contested the worker’s 
claim, JBL and the contractor jointly settled with the worker at the hearing for almost the entire amount in the DLSE 
Findings. The worker received 100% of wages owed, in addition to payment for failure to provide breaks, plus 
almost all of the damages assessed by DLSE. 
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However, both the DLSE’s investigations and Findings 
with respect to guarantors can be cursory and superficial, 
lacking the follow-through necessary to ensure that 
workers are able to receive full protection from AB 633’s 
wage guarantee. Many guarantors are either not pursued 
seriously or dropped from claims without explanation.
 DLSE failed to issue subpoenas for business 
records to over 60% of guarantors. DLSE did not 
have a standard practice of automatically sending 
subpoenas to each guarantor identified, despite 
the fact that such subpoenas are necessary to 
conduct a proper investigation of the claim.
 DLSE failed to conduct any investigation 
whatsoever of 13% of guarantors that were 
identified. It was unclear why no investigation 
was conducted.
 In claims in which DLSE Findings were issued, 
11% of the guarantors identified by workers 
were not mentioned in DLSE Findings.69 It 
was not apparent that an investigation of the 
guarantors had ever been conducted, and no 
reason was given for the omission. In addition, 
7% of the guarantors were not mentioned 
in DLSE Findings even though DLSE had 
conducted some investigation of the guarantors 
and there was no apparent reason why they were 
subsequently released from the claims. 
Our review of DLSE case files reveals a fundamental 
problem: the complete lack of a paper trail on what 
happens to many guarantors after they are identified. 
We are left to surmise that guarantors slip through the 
cracks because investigations are incomplete or shoddy, 
and there is no documentation or explanation required to 
justify the results.  
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CASE STUDIES: 
When Guarantors Slip Through the Cracks
In wage claims filed by 33 garment workers against the garment contractor GNT (see Case Study, page 27), the workers 
provided evidence to DLSE that they sewed labels for Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI). However, REI’s mere counter 
assertion in a cover letter to DLSE that it had never placed garment orders directly with GNT was sufficient to convince 
DLSE that REI was not liable under AB 633 for the workers’ wages. Despite the fact that the company’s statement 
was never investigated or independently verified by DLSE, DLSE dismissed the workers’ claims against REI without 
notifying the workers’ representative, the Asian Law Caucus (ALC). REI was not even required to cooperate in the DLSE 
investigation by providing some minimal explanation for how its garments were ordered for production at the sweatshop, 
such as providing a list of companies that acted as purported intermediaries between REI and the sweatshop. 
After the ALC and the Chinese Progressive Association helped the workers to organize and lead a successful corporate 
accountability campaign (including a massive letter-writing campaign and rally) to publicly pressure REI to pay back 
wages to the workers, REI not only agreed to provide a “grant” of $35,000 to assist the former GNT workers, but also a 
list of California factories that REI uses to make its clothes. These significant results achieved by the workers and their 
advocates outside of the DLSE process highlight the critical information that should have been uncovered by DLSE as 
part of a proper investigation — information that is readily available from companies but has not been systematically 
sought by DLSE. 
❖ ❖ ❖ ❖ ❖
In the spring and summer of 2001, hundreds of seamstresses — who had worked for several months in three 
sweatshops in downtown San Francisco without receiving any pay whatsoever — were deprived of more than $1.4 
million in unpaid wages and penalties when the sweatshops shut down and declared bankruptcy. This scenario was 
precisely the type of situation contemplated by AB 633’s wage guarantee.
With the assistance of the Chinese Progressive Association, the Women’s Employment Rights Clinic at Golden Gate 
University School of Law (WERC), and the Asian Law Caucus, the workers filed AB 633 wage claims against the 
sweatshops and alleged guarantors for which the workers made clothes (including bebe, Sam’s Club, Kmart, Mervyn’s, 
Target, Nordstrom’s, JC Penney, Sears, and Cut Loose, among others). However, DLSE brought little pressure to bear 
on the alleged guarantors and did not pursue AB 633 wage claims against them. Instead, DLSE utilized an alternative 
mechanism under AB 633 to file a lawsuit in state court for wages, damages, and penalties against the individual 
sweatshop owners and operators only, and failed to name a single guarantor. 
As a result of the perseverance of the workers’ advocates, discussions are ongoing with several companies whose 
garments were made at the sweatshops. However, to date, DLSE has not placed sufficient resources into pursuing any 
potential claims against the alleged guarantors — despite the fact that the state court judge issued a tentative decision 
finding that the workers are owed over $1.4 million in unpaid wages and penalties.
❖ ❖ ❖ ❖ ❖
As a counterpoint to the above examples of DLSE’s failure to properly investigate and pursue guarantors, the recent 
claim brought by Maria Lopez70 in Los Angeles against the private label retailer Charlotte Russe (see Case Study, 
page 21) showcases what can be achieved when DLSE does what AB 633 requires — investigates the actual 
business practices of the potential guarantor, instead of relying upon the superficial assertions of the company.
 
Despite repeated declarations by Charlotte Russe’s attorney that the company was not a wage guarantor, the DLSE 
hearing officer ruled otherwise after evaluating the facts of the case. As this case demonstrates, even if a company 
claims that it is not responsible for a worker’s unpaid wages, DLSE should ensure it is mandatory practice — not a 
rare occurrence — to examine the actual business practices of the entity in question and require, at a minimum, 
that the company provide any information in its possession that might assist DLSE to assess the facts and identify 
the appropriate guarantors.
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■ Guarantors and contractors frequently fail to turn 
over business records, and half the time DLSE does 
not require guarantors to produce any records at 
all. 
AB 633 mandates that within 10 days after a claim is 
filed, DLSE must issue a subpoena for the contractor’s 
business records — including employee payroll records 
and records of the contractor’s business relationship 
with guarantors.71 One of the primary purposes of the 
subpoena is to enable DSLE to identify guarantors, as 
well as collect proof of minimum wage and overtime 
violations. Without these records, it is difficult — and 
sometimes impossible — to identify wage guarantors and 
pursue claims against them. That is precisely why AB 633 
explicitly includes strict record-keeping requirements, 
including the power of DLSE to demand inspection of 
records and seek sanctions for failure to comply with these 
requirements.
Two other key mechanisms are designed to buttress 
DLSE’s investigative power and provide effective means 
to identify guarantors and determine their share of 
liability: 1) contractors and guarantors are required to 
maintain written contracts of their business relationship 
with each other;72 and 2) on the itemized deduction 
statements that must be provided to workers each pay 
period, contractors are required to list the names of 
guarantors for which the contractor made clothes during 
the pay period.73  
Despite these requirements, contractors in case after case 
do not turn over written records related to the guarantors 
with which they do business. They also frequently fail to 
comply with DLSE subpoenas and routinely produce 
incomplete payroll records at best.74 
 Although DLSE issued subpoenas for business 
records to contractors in almost 85% of episodes, 
contractors failed to provide any documents 18% 
of the time, and provided documents only 52% 
of the time.75 When contractors did provide 
documents, they were incomplete almost 90% of 
the time.
 To the best of our knowledge, not one contractor 
submitted copies of written contracts with 
guarantors. Furthermore, there were no itemized 
wage deduction statements listing guarantor 
names in any of the case files we examined.76
Guarantors exhibited similarly low compliance rates 
in response to DLSE subpoenas, which were issued to 
guarantors much less frequently than to contractors, 
despite the fact that business records from guarantors are 
central to conducting a proper investigation of the claim.  
 DLSE issued subpoenas to guarantors in 
less than 50% of episodes, and failed to issue 
subpoenas to over 60% of guarantors.77
 Only 54% of the guarantors to which subpoenas 
were issued provided any documents in response.  
 To the best of our knowledge, of the guarantors 
that provided documents, only 9% of these 
guarantors provided copies of written contracts 
with contractors.78
■ Sanctions for record-keeping violations are not 
pursued by DLSE, thus undercutting DLSE’s power 
and responsibility to investigate guarantors and 
enforce the wage guarantee.
DLSE has the ability to seek various sanctions for failure 
to comply with subpoenas and maintain required records, 
including the power to revoke garment registration 
licenses that are a necessary condition of operating a 
garment business in the state.79 However, DLSE does not 
seek sanctions against contractors that fail to comply with 
key record-keeping requirements.  
 DLSE revoked the garment registration license of 
only one contractor in only one episode of the 81 
episodes in which contractors either provided no 
business records or incomplete records in response 
to a subpoena. 
 In other words, there was a less than 1% chance 
that a contractor’s registration would be revoked 
if it failed to provide necessary business records to 
DLSE.
DLSE’s failure to utilize available sanctions allows 
contractors and guarantors to continue flouting the law 
without any repercussions. 
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■ DLSE takes almost twice as long to adjudicate 
wage claims than is allowed under AB 633’s 
expedited timeline. 
AB 633 mandates that DLSE must fully adjudicate 
a wage claim (i.e., reach a final disposition against all 
defendants involved) within 120 days from the date 
DLSE receives the claim. DLSE has not met AB 633’s 
expedited timeline.
 On average, it took almost 200 days to adjudicate 
an AB 633 claim. This figure is especially 
problematic given the fact that the vast of 
majority of claims were resolved short of a 
Settlement Conference or hearing.80 
The longer that garment workers have to wait for the 
resolution of their claims, the harder it is for them to 
meet basic subsistence needs. Each day that their claim 
remains unresolved places a disproportionate burden on 
garment workers who are deprived of minimum wage and 
overtime. Furthermore, the longer it takes to adjudicate 
a claim, the more time contractors have to shut down 
their operations and disappear — often making it much 
more difficult for workers to prove their cases. AB 633’s 
expedited timeline should be the rule, not the exception, 
for all low-wage workers who file wage claims at DLSE.
■ DLSE appears to be understaffed relative to the 
number of workplaces it regulates, but it is unclear 
why the self-funding mechanism of AB 633 would 
not provide sufficient resources for DLSE to fully 
enforce the law.
As of March 2005, the ratio of registered garment 
businesses to the total number of DLSE employees was 
over 13 to 1. This does not even account for companies 
that operate unregistered, let alone businesses in other 
low-wage industries which DLSE is responsible for 
inspecting. All DLSE staff who were interviewed 
mentioned that insufficient numbers of staff combined 
with a heavy caseload hampered their ability to enforce 
AB 633.  
The California Legislature intended AB 633’s garment 
registration fees to generate enough funds to implement 
and enforce the law.81 Between October 2002 and May 
2005, DLSE received $10,158,975 in garment registration 
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ur Key Findings indicate that although AB 
633 can be a potent tool for workers who are 
seeking their unpaid wages, DLSE has failed 
to fully enforce AB 633’s provisions and thus 
many companies responsible for sweatshops continue to 
ignore the law. The following Key Recommendations84 
should be implemented by DLSE to ensure that AB 633 
lives up to its original intent and that basic labor standards 
are a guarantee, not an illusion, for our state’s garment 
workers: 
  Enable workers to recover the full amount of their 
unpaid wages, as well as the penalties and damages 
they are owed under the law.
 Improve the identification and investigation of 
guarantors. 
 Assess sanctions against garment contractors and 
guarantors that fail to comply with record-keeping 
requirements.
 Report regularly to the Legislature and the public 
on DLSE’s expenditures and activities related to 
AB 633, and implement DLSE quality control 
mechanisms. 
CHAPTE
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ENABLE WORKERS TO RECOVER THE FULL AMOUNT OF 
THEIR UNPAID WAGES, AS WELL AS THE PENALTIES AND 
DAMAGES THEY ARE OWED UNDER THE LAW
For the first time in administrative wage claims, garment 
workers are able to seek redress from companies that use 
sweatshop labor. Guarantors are paying workers, who 
are receiving some protection from the wage guarantee. 
However, the core purpose of the wage guarantee is 
undermined when workers recover only a fraction — less 
than one-third — of the total amount of their unpaid 
wages. Furthermore, workers are not recovering damages 
and penalties which usually more than double their claim 
amount, and which are designed to deter future workplace 
violations.  Contractors and guarantors have no incentive 
to ensure that workers are paid their wages in the first place 
when they end up paying so little to resolve wage claims.
Two of our Key Findings in particular reveal serious 
problems with DLSE’s enforcement of the wage guarantee. 
First, not only are guarantors generally settling claims for 
an extremely small portion (less than one-sixth) of workers’ 
wages, but DLSE lets one out of every ten guarantors off 
the hook after workers settle with the contractor and/or 
the other guarantor(s) — even when workers are still owed 
wages. In these cases, DLSE abandons the wage guarantee 
by not providing workers with the option to seek the 
balance of wages owed against the remaining guarantor(s).
Second, even workers who prevail at a full administrative 
hearing are often unable to recover their wages. DLSE 
Orders are flagrantly disregarded by contractors and 
guarantors alike. Three out of every five guarantors and 18 
out of 19 contractors against which Orders were issued did 
not pay a single penny owed to the worker, and DLSE did 
not enforce judgments entered after Orders were not paid.    
Without judgment collection, garment companies will 
continue to view the administrative claims process as little 
more than an inconvenience, with no serious consequences 
attached to flouting DLSE’s authority. Workers who spend 
time they cannot afford to waste and who take many risks 
to pursue claims may win a judgment that is a mere paper 
tiger. This kind of hollow result reduces AB 633 to little 
more than an empty promise. 
If DLSE were to actively pursue judgment collection, we 
project two interrelated positive outcomes: 1) contractors 
and guarantors would take the claims process more 
seriously; and 2) workers’ ability to recover their wages, 
as well as damages and penalties — either through 
settlements, Orders, or judgments — would improve 
because workers would have more incentive not to settle 
up-front for such a small fraction of what they are owed. 
DLSE must take the following steps so that workers have 
a meaningful opportunity to recover their unpaid wages, as 
well as attendant damages and penalties:
 If a worker settles with a contractor and/or one or 
more guarantors for an amount less than wages 
owed, DLSE should automatically continue the 
claim against the remaining guarantor(s) to recover 
the balance of wages owed instead of terminating 
the case, unless the worker is fully informed of 
his/her right to proceed with the claim against all 
remaining guarantors but consents in writing to 
waive that right.
 DLSE should ensure that workers (particularly 
those who are not represented by an advocate) 
understand that they are not required or being 
encouraged by DLSE to settle their claims for only 
a fraction of their wages, and that they are legally 
entitled to damages and penalties.
 DLSE should inform workers about the 
possibility of recovering their unpaid wages from 
the Garment Special Fund, including providing 
written notice in each worker’s primary language 
about the procedure and requirements for applying 
to the Fund.
 DLSE must make collections a priority by 
enforcing judgments on behalf of workers85 either 
in-house or through an effective arrangement 
with the Franchise Tax Board or appropriate state 
agency. DLSE should also exercise its authority to 
assess penalties against contractors and guarantors 
that do not pay outstanding judgments.86
In addition, DLSE’s implementation of the following three 
categories of Key Recommendations will also enhance 
workers’ ability to receive full protection from AB 633’s 
wage guarantee. 
34 · REINFORCING THE SEAMS
IMPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF 
GUARANTORS
Although workers have received some protection from 
the wage guarantee, guarantors are still able to evade 
responsibility when DLSE fails to consistently identify and 
investigate guarantors. Our Key Findings reveal that half 
the time, the burden of identifying potential guarantors 
falls on workers. Even though workers are one reliable 
source of information on guarantors, not all workers are 
aware of the identity of guarantors (for example, some 
may not sew labels into clothing or are unable to read the 
labels). DLSE has neglected its responsibility to utilize 
investigative resources and powerful means of guarantor 
identification at its disposal – including the authority to 
require contractors and guarantors to maintain and turn 
over business records.  
Furthermore, DLSE does not routinely conduct a thorough 
and proper investigation of all potential guarantors 
identified in wage claims. Several troubling questions raised 
by our Key Findings include: 
 why some guarantors are not investigated at all, 
even after they are initially identified by workers;
 why subpoenas are issued against guarantors less 
than 50% of the time; and 
 why some guarantors appear to be investigated but 
are subsequently dropped from DLSE Findings for 
no apparent reason.
Particularly problematic is anecdotal evidence from our 
case studies that may illuminate why some guarantors 
disappear from claims: in some cases, DLSE has relied 
upon the superficial assertions of a company that it has no 
business relations with the sweatshop, without requiring 
the company to provide any information explaining how its 
clothes were ordered for production at the sweatshop.
In order for the wage guarantee to hold any meaning, 
DLSE must consistently examine the actual business 
practices of potential guarantors through effective 
identification procedures and adequate investigations, as 
follows: 
DLSE MUST TAKE MEANINGFUL STEPS TO IDENTIFY 
GUARANTORS IN ADDITION TO WORKERS’ INITIAL 
IDENTIFICATION OF GUARANTORS.
 DLSE should enforce current law requiring 
contractors to list on workers’ itemized wage 
deduction statements the names of guarantors for 
which they made clothes during the pay period.87  
 DLSE should enforce current law requiring 
contractors and guarantors to keep written 
contracts with each other, documenting 
information about price, quantity, style of garments 
to be produced, and the length of time in which 
the garments must be manufactured.88 
 DLSE deputies and BOFE deputies should 
routinely request copies of garment registration 
applications and renewals of the contractor and 
guarantor(s) immediately after a worker files an 
AB 633 claim, and not on a discretionary basis. 
The current application for garment registration 
asks applicants to list the garment companies 
with which they do business, and are therefore a 
potential source for identifying guarantors.
 To facilitate DLSE investigators’ ability to identify 
guarantors and share information about guarantors, 
DLSE should set up a computerized master list 
of all guarantors included on contractors’ garment 
registration applications and named in AB 633 
wage claims, including business name and address, 
agent for service of process, and any associated 
labels identified in the wage claims. Tracking 
label names (which are often different from the 
company’s legal name) will enable DLSE to 
identify and investigate guarantors more efficiently 
in the future. DLSE could simply add this data to 
the garment registration database that is publicly 
available on DLSE’s website.89 
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Because shoddy or non-existent record-keeping enables 
sweatshops to conceal wage and hour violations and 
guarantors to hide their connection to sweatshop labor, 
AB 633 mandates that guarantors and contractors must 
keep and turn over written business records. These records 
are central to DLSE’s ability to identify guarantors, 
adequately investigate a claim, and determine wages owed. 
Precisely for these reasons, record-keeping requirements 
are routinely ignored by contractors and guarantors 
attempting to avoid liability under the law.
DLSE currently possesses useful tools to enforce key 
record-keeping requirements.  However, DLSE rarely, if 
ever, utilizes these tools. Without real repercussions for 
non-compliance with record-keeping laws, sweatshops 
will continue to operate illegally and off the books, and 
guarantors will remain invisible while they continue to 
profit from sweatshop labor. 
DLSE must put real muscle behind record-keeping 
requirements that are integral to enforcing the wage 
guarantee, by implementing the following:  
ASSESS MONETARY PENALTIES AND DAMAGES
 DLSE should exercise its authority to assess 
monetary penalties when, in response to a 
subpoena for records, a garment contractor claims 
it does not possess employee payroll records 
and/or written contracts indicating the price 
per unit agreed to between the contractor and 
guarantor(s).92  
 DLSE should exercise its authority to assess 
monetary damages against guarantors that in 
bad faith refuse to produce records or otherwise 
cooperate with a DLSE investigation.93   
DLSE MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF 
GUARANTORS.  
 DLSE should make it a consistent practice to issue 
a subpoena for records against all guarantors and 
contractors.
 DLSE should establish clear guidelines for 
investigating guarantors, including the routine use 
of investigative checklists, forms, and questions 
(regarding, e.g., how to properly determine guarantor 
liability in the absence of records), as well as 
implement training and quality control mechanisms 
to ensure that DLSE staff follow these guidelines.
 In response to a subpoena for records, a company 
that claims it is not a guarantor should be required, 
at minimum, to provide DLSE with an affidavit 
affirming: a diligent search and reasonable inquiry 
have been made in an effort to comply with the 
demand; whether the inability to produce records 
is because a particular record has never existed, has 
been destroyed, or is no longer in the company’s 
possession or control; the names and addresses of 
any and all businesses known or believed by that 
company to have possession, custody, or control of 
the record not produced, including those businesses 
the company contracted with during the claim 
period so that DLSE can identify the relevant 
guarantor(s); and any and all information the 
company has about how its garments were ordered 
for production at the garment contractor at issue.90 
Companies that fail to submit such an affidavit 
should not be dismissed from the claim; instead, 
such failure should trigger the legal presumption 
that a worker’s competent testimony as to guarantor 
liability prevails in DLSE Findings and at the 
hearing.  
 DLSE should give no weight to representations of 
fact regarding the business practices of a guarantor 
made by the guarantor’s attorney at the Settlement 
Conference or hearing.  DLSE should assess the 
facts based on bona fide business records submitted 
by the guarantor; if none are provided, DLSE 
should enforce the legal presumption that a worker’s 





GUARANTORS THAT FAIL 
TO COMPLY WITH RECORD-
KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
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REVOKE GARMENT REGISTRATION LICENSES 
 DLSE should exercise its authority to revoke a 
contractor’s or guarantor’s garment registration if 
the contractor or guarantor fails to maintain and/or 
produce written contracts for inspection during a 
DLSE investigation.94
 DLSE should exercise its authority to revoke a 
contractor’s garment registration if it fails to comply 
with a subpoena for records,95 or fails to include 
guarantor names on wage deduction statements.96  
DENY INCOMPLETE GARMENT REGISTRATION 
APPLICATIONS 
 DLSE should refuse to issue a garment registration 
license unless the registration application is 
completed in full. The current application for 
registration asks applicants to list the garment 
companies with which they do business. Often, this 
section of the application is left blank, but a license 
is issued nonetheless.  
REPORT REGULARLY TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE PUBLIC 
ON DLSE’S EXPENDITURES AND ACTIVITIES RELATED 
TO AB 633, AND IMPLEMENT DLSE QUALITY CONTROL 
MECHANISMS
DLSE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
It is imperative that DLSE leverage its resources to 
maximize enforcement of AB 633 as the Legislature 
intended when it enacted this landmark law. Full 
transparency and public accountability will help DLSE 
reach this goal.  
The authors of this report call on DLSE to immediately 
prepare a report documenting its actual expenditures 
for AB 633, as well as how the agency spends the funds 
allocated for the administration of AB 633. DLSE 
should present this report to the Legislature at a public 
hearing. If DLSE believes that more resources are 
necessary to fully implement the law, it should provide a 
detailed explanation, including an analysis of any staffing 
deficiencies. Furthermore, DLSE should regularly report 
to the Legislature on its expenditures and activities related 
to AB 633.
Moreover, AB 633’s final regulations authorize DLSE 
to distribute publications about industry practices and 
patterns of violations.97 Since October 2002, DLSE has 
issued only 2 such publications.  
DLSE should immediately issue an updated publication 
about common industry practices and violations. This 
information would be helpful in DLSE’s assessment of 
how to most effectively allocate its resources. 
DLSE INTERNAL TRAINING AND QUALITY CONTROL 
DLSE should institute regular comprehensive trainings 
for DLSE personnel who work on AB 633 claims (such 
as BOFE deputies, DLSE deputies, and AB 633 hearing 
officers). Internal quality control mechanisms will help 
ensure that the law is fully enforced and that workers are 
able to recover what they are owed. ■
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CHAPTE
R 6 · CO
NCLUSI
ON
nvesting in the well-being of California’s low-
wage workforce — by requiring corporations to 
act responsibly and to pay workers what they are 
owed — is critical to the long-term vitality of 
our state. Six years ago, the Legislature passed AB 633 
in recognition of this fact. The bill’s goal was simple: to 
guarantee basic labor protections in an industry notorious 
for forcing workers to toil in abysmal conditions — far 
below the bare minimum standards required by law. 
This report illustrates how AB 633 can be a powerful tool 
for workers to recover their wages and hold corporations 
accountable. But poor implementation of AB 633 by 
DLSE and flagrant disregard of the law by many apparel 
companies effectively strip AB 633 of its power. Policy 
makers and labor agency officials must play an active role 
in addressing these challenges so that AB 633 operates 
as a potent law not only on paper, but also in practice. In 
this era of economic globalization, we share a common 
responsibility to nurture an economy that is vibrant and 
productive; corporations must be required to do their 
part to promote fair standards for living and working in 
this state. With proper enforcement of AB 633, we take 
critical steps in the right direction towards building a 
more just and healthy California. ■
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APPENDIX A
KEY PROVISIONS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 633
The cornerstone provisions of AB 633, which took effect on January 1, 2000, include the following:
NEW WAGE GUARANTEE
➛ Manufacturers and retailers that contract to have garment manufacturing operations performed (“guarantors”) are liable for 
their garment contractors’ violation of minimum wage and overtime laws.98 
EXPEDITED CLAIMS PROCESS
➛ An expedited administrative process at DLSE of no longer than 120 days for garment workers to have their wage claims 
adjudicated.99
STRENGTHENED RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS
➛ Requirement that garment contractors and guarantors maintain certain records, including written contracts with detailed 
information about the contract terms and conditions. These records must be maintained for four years and made available to 
DLSE for inspection and copying, as a condition of garment registration and renewal.100
➛ Requirement that DLSE issue a subpoena to garment contractors for books and records within 10 days of receiving an AB 
633 claim, and requirement that garment contractors provide complete and accurate records within 10 days of receiving the 
subpoena as a condition of continued garment registration.101 
➛ Requirement that as a condition of continued registration, contractors provide workers with information about the guarantors 
for which they are producing clothes, on the workers’ itemized wage deduction statements.102
FUNDING FOR STATE ENFORCEMENT
➛ Increased registration fees for contractors and guarantors that operate their business in California, in order to fully fund 
enforcement of AB 633 as well as contribute to the state’s Garment Special Fund, which covers unpaid wages for workers 
unable to collect on a judgment in their favor.103 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR CONTRACTORS
➛ Establishment of successor liability so that garment contractors cannot shut down and subsequently re-open under a different 
name to avoid paying the wages of their former workers.104 
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Following are supporting tables and data for selected Key Findings.
RANDOM SAMPLE
Our evaluation includes data from a random sample of 208 AB 633 claims filed by garment workers in Los Angeles. 
Year Claim Filed 2000105 2001 2002 2003 2004106
# of AB 633 Claims (in Random Sample) 4 73 70 61 0
MULTIPLE CLAIMANT EPISODES
Fifty-five (33.5%) of the 164 episodes (against 54 contractors; 1 of the 54 contractors had 2 separate episodes filed against it 
by multiple claimants) involved more than one worker (not all of whom are part of the random sample) from the same factory.
A total of 356 workers (including 99 workers who are part of the random sample) were involved in the multiple claimant 
episodes. The number of workers per multiple claimant episode could be determined in 98 of those 99 claims. Of these 98 
claims, the average number of workers per multiple claimant episode was 6.5 workers, and the median was 28 workers. 
SINCE AB 633 BECAME LAW, THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP RISE IN THE NUMBERS OF GARMENT WORKERS WHO HAVE FILED WAGE 
CLAIMS, BUT THIS INCREASE STILL PALES IN COMPARISON TO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED 
OF THEIR WAGES.
Of the 5833 AB 633 wage claims filed in Southern California107 between March 31, 2001 and March 31, 2004, 83% were filed 
in the Los Angeles DLSE office. 
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THROUGH AB 633’S WAGE GUARANTEE, GARMENT WORKERS ARE STARTING TO RECOVER UNPAID WAGES FROM COMPANIES THAT 
USE SWEATSHOPS. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THESE COMPANIES, HOWEVER, STILL DO NOT PAY A SINGLE PENNY TO 
WORKERS, WHO RECEIVE ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF WHAT THEY ARE OWED.
AVERAGE108 RECOVERY PER WORKER TOTAL RECOVERY
UCLA Preliminary Assessment109 (382 workers) $417 $159,271
Our Evaluation (208 workers) $1,365 $283,912
In our evaluation, workers in 157 (76%) of 208 claims, or 129 (79%) of 164 episodes, received money from the contractor and/
or one or more guarantors. Of these:
TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED BY WORKERS $283,912
Total Amount Paid by Contractors $201,182
Total Amount Paid by Guarantors $ 82,730
Portion of Total Amount Paid by Guarantors that was Paid Pursuant to Settlements $ 65,782
Only 86 (15%) of 586 guarantors in 39 (34%) of 115 episodes paid any money to workers. It could not be determined whether 
the worker received any money or not from 1 guarantor out of 587. Workers who received money from a guarantor(s) may also 
have recovered money from the contractor. Guarantors paid workers for the following reasons: 
# Guarantors (of 586)
Settlement with guarantor only 59
Joint Settlement between worker, contractor and one or more guarantor(s)  7
Guarantor paid (all or part of) Order110  7
Guarantor paid Order by Settlement111 10
Guarantor paid (all or part of) judgment  3112
Total 86 
 AGAINST CONTRACTORS AGAINST GUARANTORS
# Orders113 Issued  19  20 
# Orders by Settlement114 Issued  14  15
Total  33  35115
The total amount of money workers received from contractors and/or guarantors was on average only 31% of initial wages 
claimed. The following chart contains data from a set of 160 (80%) out of 200 claims, or 136 (86%) out of 158 episodes, in 
which it was possible to determine the initial wages claimed and how much total money the worker received from the contractor 
and/or guarantor(s) (including claims in which workers did not receive any money but excluding claims in which workers 
voluntarily withdrew their claims).
(OF 160 CLAIMS) TOTAL AMOUNT $ AVERAGE AMOUNT $
Wages Initially Claimed $857,274 $5,358
Amount Received From Contractor and/or Guarantor(s) $267,026 $1,669
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GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS LOW-BALL SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS SO WORKERS RECOVER ON AVERAGE ONLY ONE-THIRD OF 
WAGES OWED, AND DLSE LETS SOME GUARANTORS COMPLETELY OFF THE HOOK BEFORE ALL WAGES ARE PAID. 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT116 OUR EVALUATION
Total # Claims 382 208
Total # Claims in which worker reached one or more 
settlements (with contractor and/or guarantor(s))
108 157117
SETTLEMENTS WITH CONTRACTORS AND/OR GUARANTORS
In 157 (76%) of 208 claims, or 129 (79%) of 164 episodes, workers reached one or more settlements with the contractor and/
or one or more guarantor(s). Of these, for the 155 claims in which it was possible to determine the amount of the settlement(s):
 Total settlement amount: $274,679 (97% of $283,912, the total amount received by workers in the random 
sample; 34% of $805,662, the total wages initially claimed in these 155 claims)
 Average settlement amount/claim: $1,772
SETTLEMENTS WITH CONTRACTORS
Workers in 127 (61%) of 208 claims, or 112 (68%) of 164 episodes, settled with contractors (including 21 joint settlements). Of 
these, for the 125 claims in which it was possible to determine the amount paid by contractors (including contractors that paid 
$0):
 Total settlement amount paid by contractors: $198,611 (only 31% of $646,841, the total wages initially claimed in 
these 125 claims)
 Average settlement amount/claim paid by contractors: $1,589
SETTLEMENTS WITH GUARANTORS
Workers in 60 (29%) of 208 claims, or 42 (26%) of 164 episodes, entered into settlement agreements (including joint 
settlements and Orders by Settlement) with 150 guarantors. For 149 out of these 150 guarantors, it was possible to determine if 
and how much guarantors paid: 
 Total settlement amount paid by guarantors: $65,782 (80% of $82,730, the total amount of money paid by all 
guarantors; 16% of $407,153, the total wages initially claimed in these 60 claims)
 Average settlement amount/claim paid by guarantors: $442
150 (26%) of the 587 guarantors entered into settlements with workers (including Orders by Settlement and joint settlements). 
Of these 150 guarantors that reached settlements with workers: 
 3, or 2%, settled before a Settlement Conference,
 109, or 73%, settled at a Settlement Conference,
 13, or 9%, settled after a Settlement Conference, but before a Hearing,
 22, or 15%, settled at a Hearing,
 1, or 1%, settled after a Hearing, but before an Order was issued, and 
 2, or 1%, settled after an Order was issued.
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GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS LOW-BALL SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS SO WORKERS RECOVER ON AVERAGE ONLY ONE-THIRD OF 
WAGES OWED, AND DLSE LETS SOME GUARANTORS COMPLETELY OFF THE HOOK BEFORE ALL WAGES ARE PAID. 
DLSE FINDINGS
DLSE issued Findings in 79 (55%) of 145 claims, or 62 (55%) of 112 episodes (in which it could be determined whether or not 
DLSE Findings were issued). Of these 79 claims or 62 episodes involving 365 (67%) of 545 guarantors: 
 186 (51%) of these 365 guarantors, in 61 (77%) of the 79 claims, or 46 (74%) of the 62 episodes, were assessed 
liability in DLSE Findings.  
 Of the 186 guarantors against which DLSE Findings were issued, only 54 (29%) paid workers money. But these 54 
guarantors paid over 70% ($60,058 of $82,730) of the total amount of money paid by all guarantors. 
 Of the total of 86 guarantors who paid workers, 54 (63%) were assessed liability in DLSE Findings.  
DLSE FAILS TO IDENTIFY GUARANTORS AND CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF GUARANTORS ON A CONSISTENT BASIS, 
THUS UNDERMINING THE WAGE GUARANTEE.
IDENTIFICATION OF GUARANTORS
Preliminary Assessment118 Our Evaluation
Claims with one or more guarantor identified 112 (29%) of 382 125 (60%) of 208 
Episodes with one or more guarantor identified 30 (16%) of 189 91 (56%) of 164 
In our evaluation, the number of guarantors identified per claim ranged from 0 to 17. The average number of guarantors 
identified per claim was 2.8 (of all 208 claims).
METHOD OF INITIAL IDENTIFICATION119 
# Guarantors Identified 
(of all 587 guarantors)
WORKERS INITIALLY IDENTIFIED GUARANTORS BY: 296 (50%) (TOTAL)
Listing guarantor information on Addendum to Initial Claim form 115
Providing a (copy of) a label 26
Other methods (e.g., letter from advocate, listing on Initial Claim form) 92
A combination of 2 of the above methods 63
DLSE INITIALLY IDENTIFIED GUARANTORS BY:120 277 (47%) (TOTAL)
Investigations (e.g., BOFE deputy visited factory or guarantor, DLSE asked for information from 
contractor and/or guarantor, contractor listed guarantor(s) on DLSE garment registration application, 
DLSE Findings mentioned guarantors) 
 96
Contractors’ responses to DLSE subpoena  17
Notice of Claim or Meet and Confer121 149
DLSE subpoena sent to guarantor122 15 
CANNOT TELL HOW GUARANTORS WERE IDENTIFIED 14 (2%) (TOTAL)
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GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO TURN OVER BUSINESS RECORDS, AND HALF THE TIME DLSE DOES NOT 
REQUIRE GUARANTORS TO PRODUCE ANY RECORDS AT ALL. 
SUBPOENAS TO CONTRACTORS
DLSE issued subpoenas to contractors in 158 (79%) of 199 claims, or 133 (84%) of 158 episodes (in which it could be 
determined whether one had been issued). Of the subset of 147 claims and 127 episodes in which it could be determined 
whether or not the contractor provided documents: 
 Contractors in 29 (20%) of these 147 claims, or 23 (18%) of 127 episodes, provided no documents in response to the 
subpoena, even though the claim did not settle near the subpoena response due date, nor did the worker withdraw his/
her claim near the subpoena response due date.123
 Contractors in only 76 (52%) of these 147 claims, or 66 (52%) of 127 episodes, provided documents in response to the 
subpoena. Documents were incomplete in 67 (88%) of these 76 claims, or 58 (88%) of these 66 episodes. 
SUBPOENAS TO GUARANTORS
DLSE issued subpoenas to only 180 (38%) of the 475 guarantors against which it was possible to determine whether or not a 
subpoena had been issued (in 64 (46%) of 139 claims, or 52 (49%) of 106 episodes). 
 Only 98 (54%) of the 180 guarantors that were issued subpoenas provided documents in response (in 47 (73%) of  
64 claims, or 40 (77%) of 52 episodes).
SANCTIONS FOR RECORD-KEEPING VIOLATIONS ARE NOT PURSUED BY DLSE, THUS UNDERCUTTING DLSE’S POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE GUARANTORS AND ENFORCE THE WAGE GUARANTEE.
DLSE revoked the garment registration of only 1 contractor in only 1 (1%) of 81 episodes in which it could be determined 
whether garment registration revocation would have been an appropriate enforcement action. This contractor’s registration 
was revoked for one year because of non-compliance with a DLSE subpoena. This episode involved 20 workers from the same 
factory who filed AB 633 claims. ■
44 · REINFORCING THE SEAMS
1 The bill was authored by Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg 
and co-authored by Senator Tom Hayden during the 1999-
2000 Session. AB 633 is codified in amendments to California 
Labor Code sections 2671, 2675, 2675.5, 2676, 2677, and 
2680, and the addition of 2673.1 and 2684, effective January 1, 
2000. (All subsequent references to the California Labor Code 
are referred to as the “Labor Code.”) 2 Edna Bonacich and 
Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 181 (University of 
California Press, 2000) (referred to as Behind the Label); U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, 
Wage and Hour Division, “2000 Southern California Garment 
Compliance Survey” (Aug. 2000) (referred to as “2000 Garment 
Compliance Survey”) (on file with authors). This amount 
was calculated using a method described in Behind the Label: 
multiplying average annual back wages owed per garment 
factory (updated for the year 2000) by the “estimated [number] 
of garment shops in Los Angeles.”  3 California Trade and 
Commerce Agency, Office of Economic Research, “Apparel and 
Fashion Design” ( June 2000) (on file with authors).    
4 Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, 
“Los Angeles County Profile” (April 2004) (referred to as “Los 
Angeles County Profile”), available at http://www.laedc.org/
data/about_LA_county/la_profile.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 
2005). 5 U.S. Department of Labor, News Release “Only One-
Third of Southern California Garment Shops in Compliance 
With Federal Labor Laws” (Aug. 25, 2000) (referred to as 
“DOL News Release”), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/
media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm (last visited July 28, 2005).  
Because federal minimum wage and overtime are lower than 
California’s minimum wage and overtime, it is likely that the 
rate of violation of minimum wage and overtime laws in 
California exceeds 70%, the rate of violation of federal 
minimum wage and overtime laws. 6 Behind the Label, p. 2.   
7 Sweatshop Watch and Garment Worker Center, “Crisis or 
Opportunity? The Future of Los Angeles’ Garment Workers, 
the Apparel Industry and the Local Economy,” p. 5 (Nov. 2004) 
(referred to as “Crisis or Opportunity?”), citing 2000 U.S. 
Census PUMS data. 8 “Poverty Thresholds 2000,” 2000 U.S. 
Census (referred to as “Poverty Thresholds 2000”), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh00.
html  (last visited July 26, 2005). 9 Representing these workers 
in a federal lawsuit against the manufacturers and retailers, the 
Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC) served as lead 
counsel, along with co-counsel Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert, 
the ACLU of Southern California, Rothner, Segall, Bahan & 
Greenstone, Hadsell & Stormer, the Asian Law Caucus, and 
the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project.  The lawsuit resulted in 
over $4 million in payments to the workers. 10 See endnote 3 
above. 11 See endnote 4 above. 12 See endnote 5 above.   
13 Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational 
Safety and Health, “Garment Survey 2000” (Aug. 25, 2000) (on 
file with authors). 14 Shoddy or non-existent record-keeping 
(including failure to keep accurate and complete employee 
payroll records) is part and parcel of worker exploitation in 
garment sweatshops because it is easier for factories to violate 
wage and hour laws without a paper trail, and harder for 
workers to prove their true hours worked and wages owed.  
15 Paul M. Ong and Jordan Rickles, “Analysis of the California 
Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s Enforcement of 
Wage and Hour Laws,” p. 69 (Feb. 2004) (referred to as 
“Analysis of Enforcement of Wage and Hour Laws”), available 
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054
&context=lewis (last visited July 28, 2005). 16 See endnote 15 
above. 17 Behind the Label, p. 16; Los Angeles County Profile.  
18 California Employment Development Department, Industry 
Employment Data, Monthly and Annual Average Estimates, 
“Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale Metro Div Current 
Month Industry Employment  with Descriptive Narrative 
(Press Release)”  ( July 22, 2005), available at http://www.calmis.
ca.gov/file/lfmonth/la$PDS.pdf  (last visited July 28, 2005) 
(data is for “apparel manufacturing” employees). 19 According to 
the 2000 Census, 70% of garment workers in Los Angeles are 
Latino, and 20% are Asian.  Roughly 85% of the garment 
workforce are women, and 94% are immigrants.  Behind the 
Label, p. 174. 20 “Crisis or Opportunity?,” p. 4 (based on Census 
2000 PUMS data). 21 “Crisis or Opportunity?,” p. 4.  22 Behind 
the Label, p. 2.  23 See endnotes 7 and 8 above. 24 The final 
implementing regulations became effective in October 2002, 
nearly three years after the law’s passage.  This delay cost the 
state millions of dollars because increased registration fees 
mandated by AB 633 were not collected – fees that were 
intended to fund AB 633’s enforcement.  In the period from 
October 2002 to May 2005, over $10 million in garment 
registration fees were collected.  Data from DLSE Licensing 
Unit, “Garment Applications and Amounts by Month on or 
after 10/9/2002,” Report run on May 17, 2005 (referred to as 
“Garment Applications and Amounts Report”) (on file with 
authors). 25 The random sample was generated using SPSS 
statistical analysis software and consisted of two runs of 104 out 
of 1044 claims.  The findings from this random sample of 208 
claims generally have a 5.1% margin of error with a 90% 
confidence interval, although the margin of error may vary by 
question. 26 Six of the random sample cases were filed by the 
workers at DLSE before March 31, 2001, but not docketed 
(entered by DLSE in its claim tracking system) until on or after 
March 31, 2001. 27 Because most AB 633 claims involve 
multiple defendants (i.e., a contractor and one or more 
guarantors) whose interests are not always aligned, it is common 
for AB 633 claims to conclude at different times against 
different defendants.  For example, a guarantor may settle with 
the worker shortly after she files an AB 633 claim, but the 
contractor may never settle, which usually results in the claim 
proceeding to judgment — a process that may take many 
months.  In order to give an accurate snapshot of how the AB 
633 process works from start to finish, the random sample was 
selected from wage claims in which the claim had concluded 
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against each and every defendant.  Including open claims in the 
random sample would have resulted in the omission of critical 
information necessary to inform a reliable understanding of the 
AB 633 claims process. 28 Review and analysis of these case files 
was conducted by a team of students and volunteers working 
under the supervision of Judy Marblestone, Attorney and Equal 
Justice Works Fellow at APALC. 29 Gary Blasi, et al., 
“Implementation of AB 633: A Preliminary Assessment,” p. 4 
( July 26, 2001) (referred to as “Preliminary Assessment”), 
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/AB633PreliminaryReport
Draft72601.htm (last visited July 26, 2005).  This Preliminary 
Assessment is the first and only other evaluation of AB 633 
conducted since it passed. 30 Episodes involving more than one 
worker from the same factory are referred to as “multiple 
claimant episodes.”  Not all workers in the multiple claimant 
episodes are part of the random sample.  There are more 
episodes than contractors in the random sample because 4 
contractors were each involved in 2 separate episodes apiece.  
31 See Chapter 3: Methodology for more information about the 
random sample.  Some comparisons are made in this Chapter to 
a Preliminary Assessment of AB 633 conducted by the UCLA 
School of Law.  The Preliminary Assessment analyzed the 
implementation and enforcement of AB 633 during the first 15 
months of its implementation, from January 2000 to March 
2001.  See endnote 29 above. 32 Letter dated December 21, 2000 
to Assembly Member Gloria Romero from State Labor 
Commissioner, Arthur Lujan (on file with authors).   
33 Data from California Labor and Workforce Development 
Agency (received June 20, 2005 and July 29, 2005) (on file with 
authors). 34 See endnotes 5 and 18 above. 35 Comparison data for 
the first 15 months of implementation was taken from the 
Preliminary Assessment, p. 3.  See endnote 29 above.  Amounts 
were recovered from settlements or Order, Decision, or Awards 
(referred to in our evaluation as “Orders”).  Average amount 
recovered could not be assessed against average amount claimed 
because this data was not available in the Preliminary 
Assessment.   In the Preliminary Assessment, the median 
amount claimed per worker was $920.  In our evaluation, the 
median amount claimed per worker was $1553. 36 An Order 
results from a full administrative hearing and includes a 
statement of facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning 
behind the Order award.  Orders differ from “Orders by 
Settlement,” which are issued when claims settle at the hearing, 
but before any evidence or testimony is introduced. 37 This 
amount was paid by 86 guarantors, and includes payments 
resulting from settlements, Orders, and judgments. 38 This was 
calculated from the set of 20 guarantors against which Orders 
were issued; 8 of 20 guarantors paid the Order and paid it in 
full. 39 Comparison data for the first 15 months of 
implementation was taken from the Preliminary Assessment, 
pp. 3, 6.  See endnote 29 above. 40 Settlements include Orders by 
Settlement (issued when settlements are reached at the hearing, 
but prior to the presentation of evidence by any party) and joint 
settlements (settlements between the worker, the contractor, and 
one or more guarantors; settlement payments come from one or 
more of these defendants who are parties to the joint 
settlement). 41 All names of garment workers in this and 
subsequent Case Studies of this report have been changed to 
maintain worker anonymity.  Technical terms referencing 
various aspects of the AB 633 claims process are defined in 
Overview of AB 633 Claims Process, p.16. 42 This percentage 
was derived from analyzing aggregate wages for all workers in 
the random sample; some individual workers received less than 
31% of their wages initially claimed, some received more. 43 This 
average was calculated from a set of 352 guarantors, which 
included guarantors that were potentially liable for the worker’s 
wages but paid no money to the worker.  This set excluded (a) 
guarantors against which the worker voluntarily withdrew or 
abandoned his or her claim; and (b) guarantors in claims where 
workers had already received all of his or her wages claimed, 
thus eliminating any potential liability for remaining guarantors. 
44 This was calculated from the set of 20 guarantors against 
which Orders were issued; 12 of 20 guarantors paid nothing.  
Our evaluation also found that only 1 of 19 contractors paid 
workers as a result of an Order.  This finding further underscores 
the need to fully enforce the wage guarantee. 45 For 2 of these 
judgments, DLSE collected only a small portion (just over 5%) 
of the judgment amount. 46 Pseudonym. 47 See Labor Code 
sections 98.2(i) and 98.3 (a). 48 See California Revenue and 
Taxation Code section 19290 (referred to as “Revenue and 
Taxation Code”). 49 California State Auditor, “Franchise Tax 
Board: Significant Program Changes Are Needed to Improve 
Collections of Delinquent Labor Claims,” pp. 1, 13 (May 2004) 
(referred to as “FTB Report 2004”), available at http://www.
bsa.ca.gov/bsa/pdfs/2003-131.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).  
The FTB is authorized to collect the delinquent “fees, wages, 
penalties, costs, and interest (claims) that result from labor law 
violations by California employers,” including violations of AB 
633.  An analysis of claims referred to the FTB in 2001-2003 
showed that the FTB collected full or partial payment on only 
20% of these claims. 50 FTB Report 2004, pp. 18-19. 51 FTB 
Report 2004, p.13 (based on a sample of 60 claims). 52 FTB 
Report 2004, p. 18. 53 For the purposes of this report, a joint 
settlement is one between a worker, the contractor, and one or 
more guarantors.  Workers entered into joint settlements in 21 
(10%) of the 208 claims in our evaluation. 54 This is particularly 
true when considering the abysmal rate of recovery on Orders 
even when workers prevail at a hearing.  See endnote 44. 55 This 
percentage was derived from comparing aggregate wages 
received and claimed by all workers in the random sample for 
whom wage data was available; some individual workers 
received less than this percentage of their wages initially 
claimed, some received more. 56 See endnote 55.  57 See endnote 
55. 58 Multiple guarantors are typically involved in each AB 633 
claim.  The average number of guarantors identified per claim in 
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our evaluation was 2.8.  59 Pseudonyms. 60 See Labor Code 
section 2675.5. 61 See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(3).  When 
more than one guarantor is identified, DLSE must determine 
each guarantor’s share of liability.  The average number of 
guarantors identified per claim in our evaluation was 2.8.   
62 In our evaluation, we determined that a guarantor was 
“identified” if DLSE had taken some step to notify the 
guarantor of its potential liability, including any of the 
following: sending a notice of the claim and settlement 
conference, sending a subpoena, assessing liability in a Findings 
and Assessment (referred to in our evaluation as “DLSE 
Findings”), holding a hearing, and/or issuing an Order. 63 It is 
helpful to analyze guarantor identification by episode in order 
not to overstate the data.  See Chapter 3: Methodology. 
Workers from the same factory who file wage claims together, 
or around the same time, often work on clothing for the same 
guarantors; if each guarantor were counted once per claim filed 
by each worker, the number of guarantors identified would be 
artificially inflated due to duplicative counts. 64 Comparison data 
for the first 15 months of implementation was taken from the 
Preliminary Assessment, pp. 4-5.  See endnote 29 above.  In the 
Preliminary Assessment, a guarantor was “identified” if the 
guarantor was entered into DLSE’s computer tracking system, 
signifying that some step had been taken to notify the guarantor 
of its potential liability.  65 See Appendix B for detailed data.   
It is commendable that DLSE seeks information from workers 
about guarantors.  However, DLSE’s over-reliance on workers 
for information neglects DLSE’s independent obligation to 
conduct adequate investigations.  In our evaluation, we 
determined that workers identified guarantors by submitting 
labels of clothes they made at the contract shop; submitting lists 
of guarantor names via advocates who were representing them 
in their claims; and/or listing the guarantors or their associated 
clothing labels on DLSE’s “Addendum” form as part of filing 
the initial claim.  It is likely that workers verbally identified 
additional guarantors to DLSE investigators, but this method of 
identification by workers was not possible to discern from a 
manual review of the case files.  Presumably, any instances in 
which guarantors were initially identified through worker 
testimony have been subsumed under other methods of 
identification otherwise attributable to DLSE’s identification of 
guarantors. 66 See Labor Code section 2673.1 (d)(3). 67 Over 
70% of the 150 settlements entered into by guarantors occurred 
at the “Meet-and-Confer” settlement conference (referred to in 
our evaluation as the “Settlement Conference”), when DLSE 
Findings were issued.  Guarantors who were assessed liability in 
DLSE Findings were more likely to pay workers.  Over 60% of 
the 86 guarantors who paid workers were assessed liability in 
DLSE Findings.  68 Pseudonym. 69 This data may include 
guarantors DLSE could not locate, but this was not possible to 
determine since no indication to that effect was written in the 
case file; it does not include guarantors against which workers 
voluntarily withdrew or abandoned their claims. 70 Pseudonym. 
71 See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(1).  72 See California Code 
of Regulations section 13659 (a) and (b) (referred to as “Code 
of Regulations”). 73 See Code of Regulations section 13659 (c).   
74 Incomplete payroll records are used to cover up wage and 
hour violations.  In addition, payroll records are manipulated in 
a variety of ways to cheat workers out of the wages they are 
owed.  For example, many garment workers are forced to work 
“off-the-clock”: to punch their time cards well after they have 
started working, and to punch out long before they stop 
working.  Time cards are routinely doctored to reflect fewer 
hours than are actually worked, and workers are then required to 
sign falsified time cards in order to get paid.  Documents 
indicating piece rate production are also routinely doctored to 
indicate fewer pieces than are actually sewn.  Pay stubs are 
routinely falsified to indicate higher wage rates than are actually 
paid to workers. 75 This data was analyzed from the subsets of 
episodes in which it could be determined whether or not DLSE 
had issued a subpoena to the contractor and whether or not 
documents were provided.  See Appendix B for detailed 
explanation of data.  Episodes in which contractors did not 
provide any documents in response to the subpoena were 
excluded from our analysis if the claim settled shortly 
(approximately one month) after the subpoena response due 
date, if the worker withdrew his/her claim, or if the contractor 
could not be located to issue the subpoena.  It is helpful to 
analyze subpoena compliance by episode in order not to overstate 
the data; if subpoena compliance were analyzed per claim filed 
by each worker, the compliance rate would be artificially inflated 
due to duplicative counts in cases where multiple workers filed 
claims against the same contractor. 76 No DLSE case files 
contained a written contract submitted by a contractor, nor any 
itemized wage deduction statements listing guarantor names.   
It is possible that such documents were submitted to the Bureau 
of Field Enforcement (BOFE) and are maintained in separate 
files to which we did not have access. 77 This data was analyzed 
from the subsets of episodes in which it could be determined 
whether or not DLSE had issued a subpoena to the guarantor 
and whether or not documents were provided.  See Appendix B 
for detailed explanation of data. 78 Of the 98 guarantors that 
provided documents, nine provided copies of a written contract.  
It is possible that written contracts for an additional number of 
guarantors were submitted to the Bureau of Field Enforcement 
(BOFE) and are maintained in separate files to which we did 
not have access. 79 See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(1) and 
2675; Code of Regulations section 13659 (b) and (c). 80 Workers 
in less than half of the claims participated in Settlement 
Conferences.  Hearings were held in only 17% of the claims.  
81 See Labor Code sections 2674.2 and 2675.5. 82 Garment 
Applications and Amounts Report. 83 It is possible that a 
portion of this amount is being deposited into the Garment 
Special Fund to pay workers who cannot collect wages owed 
from contractors and/or guarantors.  See Labor Code section 
2675.5. 84 Interviews with DLSE staff informed a number of 
these recommendations. 85 See Labor Code sections 98.2(i) and 
98.3(a). 86 See Labor Code section 2678 (a)(1). 87 See Code of 
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Regulations section 13659 (c). 88 See Code of Regulations 
section 13659 (a) and (b); Labor Code section 2673 (e). 89 See 
“DLSE Garment manufacturers and contractors registration 
database,” available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/databases/dlselr/
Garmreg.html (last visited July 26, 2005). 90 These requirements 
mirror those mandated under California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2031.230. 91 See Code of Regulations section 
13655. 92 See Labor Code sections 2673 and 2678 (a)(3). 
93 See Labor Code section 2673.1(e). 94 See Code of Regulations 
section 13659 (a) and (b). 95 See Labor Code section 
2673.1(d)(1). 96 See Code of Regulations section 13659 (c). 
97 See Code of Regulations section 13632. 98 See Labor Code 
sections 2671 and 2673.1. 99 See Labor Code section 2673.1. 
100 See Code of Regulations section 13659. 101 See Labor Code 
section 2673.1 (d)(1). 102 See Code of Regulations section 13659 
(c). 103 See Labor Code section 2675.5 and Code of Regulations 
section 13635. 104 See Labor Code section 2684. 105 Six of the 
random sample cases were filed by the workers at DLSE before 
March 31, 2001, but not docketed (entered by DLSE in its 
claim tracking system) until on or after March 31, 2001, which 
is why they are included in the random sample. 106 There are 
no cases in 2004, because the random sample includes only 
claims docketed against the first defendant between Jan. 1, 
2004 and Feb. 18, 2004 and none of these claims were closed 
for all defendants based on data provided by DLSE on April 
6, 2004. 107 Southern California includes the Los Angeles, 
Long Beach, Santa Ana, and Van Nuys DLSE offices. 108 Both 
averages are calculated using the total number of workers in 
each Assessment (382 in the Preliminary Assessment and 208 
in our Evaluation).  Thus, the averages are probably slightly 
lower than they should be because they include claims in which 
workers received no money because they voluntarily withdrew 
their wage claims, thus relieving defendants of any potential 
legal responsibility to pay.  The average recovery per worker in 
our Evaluation rises to $1,669 if it is calculated from the set of 
160 claims in which the worker did not voluntarily withdraw 
or abandon his or her claim (comparable data is not available 
for the Preliminary Assessment). 109 Preliminary Assessment, 
p. 4.  See endnote 29 above. 110 An “Order” results from a full 
administrative hearing.  Such Orders include a statement of 
facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning behind the 
Order award. 111 “Orders by Settlement” are issued when claims 
settle at the hearing, but before any evidence, testimony, etc. is 
introduced.  Defendants who enter Orders by Settlement waive 
their right to a full administrative hearing.  If they do not pay 
the Order by Settlement amount, then the Order by Settlement 
will be entered as a final judgment. 112 One of these judgments 
was paid in satisfaction of an Order and 2 judgments were paid 
in satisfaction of Orders by Settlement. 113 See endnote 110 
above. 114 See endnote 111 above. 115 An additional 4 Orders 
which were issued in favor of guarantors (i.e., guarantors were 
not found liable) are not included here. 116 See endnote 29 above. 
117 Settlements include negotiated settlements reached prior to a 
hearing, as well as Orders by Settlement (settlements reached at 
the hearing). 118 Preliminary Assessment, pp. 4-5.  See endnote 
29 above. 119 Initial identification was determined by locating 
the document in each case file with the earliest date on which 
the guarantor’s name appeared. 120 The number of guarantors 
whose initial identification is attributed to DLSE may be 
inflated because workers may have initially identified some of 
these guarantors, told DLSE which labels they worked on, and 
then DLSE followed-up on the worker testimony.  However, 
it was impossible to determine this information from the case 
files, so such initial identification is attributed to DLSE.   
121 For guarantors that were mentioned for the first time on the 
Notice, it is unclear exactly how they were identified so such 
identification is attributed to DLSE. 122 DLSE sent subpoenas 
to 180 guarantors.  However, the number in this chart is much 
lower because it signifies guarantors that were initially identified 
(first mentioned in the case file) through the subpoena  
(as opposed to, e.g., guarantors that were first identified by 
workers and then DLSE sent a subpoena). 123 Claims in which 
contractors did not provide any documents in response to the 
subpoena were excluded if the claim settled shortly (up to 
approximately one month) after the subpoena response due 
date, if the worker withdrew his/her claim, or if the contractor 
could not be located to issue the subpoena.
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